Beliefbased Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty—An Intelligent Ag 阿里云 kindle chm umd 极速 pdf txt 下载

　　《不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性（智能代理的视角英文版）》安排如下：在第1章中，我们首先提供在博弈论的话题，在这本书中所讨论的概念有关的介绍。在第2章中，我们回顾了一些相关的文学作品，特别是在合作博弈理论和多Agent联盟形成问题。在第3章中，我们将讨论在代理的信念对游戏的稳定性的不确定性的影响。采用以规则为基础的方法和强大的核心和弱核心的概念引入。我们还讨论了信仰联盟的稳定性精度的效果。我们在第4章，不可转让的实用程序（NTU）游戏中引入民间信仰，使代理商的喜好不再是常识。信念精度稳定性的影响也检查

Chapter 1  Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability

1.1  Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems

1.1.1  Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems

1.1.2  Two Basic Solution Concepts of Coalition

Formations

1.2  Coalition Formation and Game Theory

1.2.1  Transferable Utility Games

1.2.2  Non-transferable Utility Games

1.3  Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption

References

Chapter 2  Non-transferable Utility Games and

Coalition Formation Mechanisms

2.1  Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games

2.2  Transferable Utility Cooperative Games

2.3  Coalition Formation Mechanisms

2.4  Belief and Uncertainties

References

Chapter 3  Two Classes of Stability

-- Strong Core and Weak Core

3.1  Coalition Formation and Stability

3.2  An Example

3.3  NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty

3.4  Opinions and Preferences of Agents

3.5  The Strong Core and the Weak Core

3.6  Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions

3.7  Application Areas

3.8  Summary

References

Chapter 4  The b-Core： Belief-based Coalition

Stability

4.1  Games Without Common Knowledge

4.2  Belief-based Coalitional Games

4.3  NTU Games with Private Beliefs

4.4  The Core， the b-Core and Belief Accuracy

4.5  Discussion

4.6  On Dynamic Beliefs

4.7  Summary

References

Chapter 5  Example Application of the b-Core：

Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs

5.1  Buyer Coalition Problems

5.1.1  Are the Utility Really Transferable？

5.1.2  How About Stability？

5.1.3  Private Information in Buyer Coalition

5.1.4  Existing Approaches

5.1.5  A New Approach

5.2  Background of Buyer Coalition Problem

5.2.1  Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference

5.2.2  Agent Beliefs

5.2.3  NTU Buyer Coalition Games

5.2.4  Properties of the b-Core in NTU-Buyer

Games

5.2.5  On Mechanism Design

5.3  A Distributed Mechanism

5.3.1  Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition

Formation Mechanism

5.3.2  An Example of the Mechanism

5.4  Experiment

5.4.1  Performance of the Mechanism

5.4.2  Evidence of Incentive Compatibility

5.5  Summary

References

Chapter 6  The Complete Picture： sb-Core and

wb-Core

6.1  Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs

6.2  An Illustrating Example

6.3  NTU-BU Games

6.3.1  Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games

6.3.2  NTU-BU Games Stability

6.4  Properties

6.4.1  Relationships of the Four Criteria

6.4.2  Effect of Refinedness

6.4.3  Effect of Accuracy

6.5  Summary

References

Chapter 7  Conclusion

7.1  New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU

Games

7.2  The Future

References

Book References

Index

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